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In Part 1 of this article (Viard 2000), I dis-
cuss how replacing the income tax with a con-
sumption tax generally reduces the value of the
existing capital stock. In Part 2, I examine the
allocation of this wealth decline between hold-
ers of different financial assets. How much of
the total decline in the value of firms’ capital is
borne by bondholders and how much by stock-
holders? Are there wealth transfers between
household lenders and household borrowers?
I consider three consumption tax designs
—a retail sales tax, a traditional value-added tax
(VAT), and a two-part VAT (“flat tax”)—and
show that they have similar potential effects.
However, the impact of the consumption tax
depends on how monetary policy responds to
the tax reform and what transition policies, if
any, are adopted.
If monetary policy keeps the consumer
price level unchanged, the wealth decline gen-
erally falls on stockholders rather than bond-
holders. Also, there is little reallocation of wealth
between household lenders and borrowers. It is
possible to alter these outcomes with a transi-
tion policy that aids stockholders and house-
hold borrowers at the expense of bondholders
and household lenders.
The effects are different if monetary policy
accommodates the consumption tax by allowing
the consumer price level to rise. Such accom-
modation is unlikely under a two-part VAT, but
observers disagree on whether it might be
adopted under a sales tax or traditional VAT to
ease possible labor-market rigidities. If the tax is
fully or largely accommodated, bondholders
bear a heavier burden than stockholders. Also,
wealth is transferred from household lenders to
borrowers.
I first describe the three consumption tax
designs and their effect on the total value of
capital and after-tax rates of return. I then exam-
ine the allocation of the wealth decline under
different monetary policy responses.
ALTERNATIVE TAX SYSTEMS
Economic Framework
I use a simple framework with no uncer-
tainty and no international trade and invest-
ment. Firms produce consumer goods for sale
to households, as well as capital and intermedi-
ate inputs for sale to other firms or for internal
use. Capital depreciates at geometric rate δ ,
while intermediate inputs are (by definition)
immediately used up in production.
Each firm issues bonds that promise fixed
future payments and stocks that are residual
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claims on all other cash flows generated by the
firm’s capital. By construction, the combined
value of the bonds and stocks equals the value
of the capital. The aggregate value of firms’
capital equals national wealth. Households also
make loans to each other. Since each loan is an
asset of the lender and an offsetting liability of
the borrower, these loans do not add to national
wealth.
For each of the consumption tax designs
and the income tax, I assume tax rates are the
same across firms or households. To address
regressivity, households may receive refundable
exemptions. Revenues are distributed to house-
holds as transfer payments.
I compare the application of the tax sys-
tems in an example with two firms, Upstream
and Downstream. Figure 1 shows the transac-
tions between firms and households, with
arrows denoting the direction of payment. I
assume units are chosen such that consumer
goods, capital, and intermediate inputs have the
same per-unit marginal cost (at the observed
output level).
1
During the year, Upstream produces 50 +
K1 units of capital, selling 50 to Downstream
and retaining K1. However, D1 units of capital
depreciate. The firm also produces 300 + I1 units
of intermediate inputs, of which it sells 300 units
to Downstream and uses I1 units internally.
Upstream purchases labor from households at a
cost of 280 units. It distributes its remaining cash
flow of 70 to its bondholders and stockholders.
Figure 1 shows the capital income Up-
stream generates, 70 + K1 – D1, which is pro-
duction (minus depreciation of capital and usage
of intermediate inputs) minus wage payments.
The figure also reports investment, K1 –  D1,
which is the net increase in the firm’s capital.
Note that cash flow equals capital income minus
investment. I do not assign values to internal-
use production and depreciation because these
values cannot be observed from payment flows.
Downstream produces 500 units of con-
sumer goods and sells them to households. It
also produces K2 units of capital and purchases
another 50 units from Upstream. D2 units of
capital are used up through depreciation. Down-
stream produces I2 units of intermediate inputs
and purchases 300 units from Upstream, all of
which are used in its production. Downstream
buys labor from households at a cost of 140
units and distributes 10 units of cash flow to its
bondholders and stockholders. This cash flow
equals the firm’s capital income, 60 + K2 – D2,
minus investment, 50 + K2 – D2.
The key difference between the various
consumption tax designs is whether the tax is
imposed on firms or on households. Table 1
explains the calculation of the bases on which
the firms are taxed under each system.
2
Retail Sales Tax
Under the retail sales tax, each firm is
taxed on the consumer goods it produces. The
aggregate tax base is clearly national consump-
tion. Firms are not taxed on production of capi-
tal or intermediate inputs (whether used inter-
nally or sold to other firms), and households are
not taxed. So Downstream is taxed on 500 units
of consumer goods, with no tax on Upstream or
the households.
Sales tax rates can be expressed in either
tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive terms. For example,
consider a consumer good for which a house-
hold pays a firm $100 and the firm pays $25
Figure 1
Application of Consumption Tax Designs
Upstream
Households
Capital income: 70 + K1 – D1
Investment: K1 – D1
Downstream
Capital income: 60 + K2 – D2
Investment: 50 + K2 – D2
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sales tax and retains the other $75. The tax-
exclusive rate is 33.3 percent because the $25
tax payment is 33.3 percent of the $75 after-tax
amount retained by the firm. However, the tax-
inclusive rate is 25 percent because the $25 tax
payment is 25 percent of the household’s $100
pretax payment.
Although sales tax rates are usually ex-
pressed in tax-exclusive form, I use the tax-
inclusive form for the sales tax and the other
consumption tax designs. This is consistent with
the common practice of reporting income tax
rates in tax-inclusive form; if a household re-
ceives $100 pretax income, pays $25 income
tax, and retains $75, the rate is said to be 25 per-
cent, not 33.3 percent. In this article, I generally
assume a 25 percent tax-inclusive rate for a new
consumption tax because this rate is roughly
sufficient to replace current U.S. individual and
corporate income tax revenues.
3
Traditional VAT
The traditional VAT taxes each firm on its
value added, which is its sales (of consumer
goods, capital, and intermediate inputs) minus
its purchases (of capital and intermediate
inputs), as the second row of Table 1 shows.
Upstream’s value added is 350 because it sells
50 units of capital and 300 units of intermediate
inputs to Downstream and makes no purchases.
Downstream’s value added is 150 because it
sells 500 units of consumer goods and pur-
chases 50 units of capital and 300 units of inter-
mediate inputs from Upstream. The combined
tax base is still 500.
The VAT differs from the sales tax only
when one firm sells capital or intermediate
inputs to another firm. Neither firm owes any-
thing under the sales tax; the VAT imposes tax
on the seller but reduces the purchaser’s tax by
the same amount. Since their combined liability
is zero, capital and intermediate inputs effec-
tively remain tax-exempt. (As with the sales tax,
no tax is imposed on internal-use production of
capital or intermediate inputs.) The aggregate
VAT base, like the aggregate sales tax base, is
national consumption.
Two-Part VAT
Unlike the tax designs outlined above, the
two-part VAT is partly imposed on households.
As the third row of Table 1 shows, the base on
which each firm is taxed is the same as under
the traditional VAT, except that wage payments
are deductible. Each household is taxed on its
wage income. So Downstream is taxed on 70
(350 value added minus 280 wage payment),
Upstream is taxed on 10 (150 value added minus
140 wage payment), households are taxed on
420 wages, and the aggregate base is still 500.
Since the combined tax base on which each
firm and its workers are taxed under the two-
part VAT is the same as the base on which the
firm is taxed under the traditional VAT, the two
taxes have the same aggregate base.
It can be seen that the base on which each
firm is taxed—value added minus wages—
equals the cash flow distributed to bondholders
and stockholders. In the aggregate, firms are
taxed on national cash flow and households are
taxed on national wages. Many economists have
noted that national consumption equals national
cash flow plus national wages.
4
Following the usage of its most prominent
supporters, Hall and Rabushka (1995), the two-
part VAT is usually called the “flat tax,” a mis-
leading name that often causes it to be confused
with a flat-rate income tax.
5
Income Tax
The aggregate income tax base is net
national product, defined as national consump-
tion plus net investment (the production of new
capital minus depreciation). The fourth row of
Table 1 describes a two-part income tax system
in which firms are taxed on the net capital
income they generate and households are taxed
on wages. To bring each firm’s net investment
into the tax base, the two-part VAT is modified
in three ways. The deduction for capital pur-
Table 1
Computation of Base on Which Firm Is Taxed
Minus
Sales of Minus Internal Minus Sales of purchases of Minus
consumer Sales of purchases production depreciation intermediate intermediate wage
goods capital of capital of capital of capital inputs inputs payments
Retail sales tax ✔
Traditional VAT ✔✔✔ ✔ ✔
Two-part VAT ✔✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
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chased from other firms is eliminated (but the
tax on selling firms is retained), capital pro-
duced for internal use is taxed, and depreciation
is deducted. The treatment of intermediate inputs
does not change; inputs used internally remain
tax-exempt, and purchased inputs remain
deductible (offsetting the tax on the selling
firm).
6 Upstream is taxed on 70 + K1 – D1 and
Downstream is taxed on 60 + K2 – D2, the capi-
tal incomes shown in Figure 1. Households con-
tinue to pay tax on their wage income of 420.
The aggregate tax base is 550 + K1 + K2 – D1 –
D2, which is net national product.
The income tax base is more complex than
the consumption tax base because it requires
the measurement of depreciation and internal-
use capital. Distinguishing capital from inter-
mediate inputs and measuring depreciation of
the former are unavoidable complications of the
income tax.
7
This hypothetical two-part income tax
omits many of the complicating features of the
actual U.S. individual and corporate income tax.
I now add a few of the omitted features to the
analysis. I assume firms are taxed at rate τ f on
the tax base described above. (Since corporations
can deduct interest paid to bondholders but not
payments to stockholders, this approach implic-
itly assumes that firms issue a mix of bonds and
stocks and reduces the value τ f to reflect the tax
savings from the interest deduction.) To repre-
sent the various investment incentives in the
U.S. income tax, I assume firms receive an
investment tax credit at rate Z for purchases and
internal production of capital and pay a recap-
ture tax of the same rate on sales of capital.
Households are taxed at rate τ p on both
wages and capital income from firms (although
the capital income is also taxed at the firm
level). This same tax rate applies to household
loans; household lenders are taxed on their
interest income and household borrowers
deduct their interest expense. Capital income 
is measured in nominal terms; bondholders 
and household lenders are taxed on the portion
of interest that compensates for inflation, and
household borrowers deduct this interest. Stock-
holders similarly pay tax on the portion of capi-
tal gains that reflects inflation. Capital gains are
taxed on accrual, and there are no front-loaded
savings incentives.
TOTAL VALUE OF CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN
I define the value of capital as the con-
sumption owners gain when they liquidate one
unit of capital or, conversely, the consumption
households must sacrifice to obtain one unit. 
I now examine the equilibrium relationship be-
tween the value of capital and its production
cost under different taxes by considering a small
change, or perturbation, to the circular flow be-
tween a firm and its bondholders and stock-
holders. This analysis also explains the relation-
ship between the marginal product of capital
and the after-tax rate of return savers receive.
In the initial year, a firm produces one
additional unit of capital, reducing its output of
consumer goods as required by its production
function. The firm issues bonds and stocks that
represent claims on the cash flow from the new
capital and sells them to a household.
8 Since the
firm is indifferent to small changes around the
optimum, the equilibrium price at which it sells
these securities must equal the after-tax receipts
it would have obtained by selling the foregone
consumer goods. The household purchasing the
securities reduces its consumption by the pur-
chase price. This reduction in consumption is
the value of capital.
The capital stock remains one unit higher
in each subsequent year. The output the addi-
tional capital produces, net of the portion re-
quired to replace depreciation, is sold as con-
sumer goods. The firm distributes its after-tax
proceeds from these sales to the household
owning the securities. After paying any applica-
ble taxes, the household consumes these pro-
ceeds. The after-tax rate of return equals the
ratio of the increase in the household’s con-
sumption in each of these years to its consump-
tion loss in the initial year.
Table 2 shows the results of this perturba-
tion under the various tax systems.
Consumption Tax
The three consumption tax designs oper-
ate identically in this context. Let Q and MPK
denote the equilibrium production cost of capi-
tal and its marginal product (both in terms of
consumption). The firm receives a tax savings of
τ cQ by producing tax-exempt capital rather than
taxable consumer goods. The equilibrium value
of the securities and the reduction in the house-
hold’s consumption must be (1 – τ c)Q, which is
the value of capital.
9
In each subsequent year, the capital yields
MPK units of output, δ Q units of which are
invested to replace depreciation. The firm sells
the remainder as consumer goods, paying tax of
τ c(MPK – δ Q) on these sales. The household
receives (1 – τ c)(MPK – δ Q) on its securities and
consumes this amount. Dividing this annual
consumption by the initial consumption reduc-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 24
tion of (1 – τ c)Q reveals that the after-tax rate of
return is (MPK/Q) – δ , which is the same as the
pretax rate of return. The consumption tax does
not drive a wedge between the pretax and after-
tax rates of return and therefore does not distort
consumption–saving decisions.
Income Tax
The effect of the income tax is described
in the last row of each panel. Let Q* and MPK*
denote the equilibrium production cost of capi-
tal and marginal product under the income tax.
When the firm produces a unit of capital instead
of Q* units of consumption, it receives tax sav-
ings of ZQ* from the investment tax credit. The
securities must have an equilibrium value of 
(1 – Z)Q*, which is the value of capital. In each
subsequent year, both the firm and the house-
hold pay tax on the output, as the table shows.
Since the after-tax rate of return is lower than
the pretax rate of return, the income tax distorts
consumption–saving decisions.
Tax Reform’s Impact on Value of Capital
An immediate, unexpected replacement of
the income tax with a consumption tax changes
the value of capital from (1 – Z)Q* to Q. The
result can be simplified by imposing two re-
strictive assumptions. First, an unlimited quan-
tity of capital can be produced at constant cost,
so Q = Q*. Second, the income tax system pro-
vides no investment tax credit (or other front-
loaded investment incentives), so Z is zero.
Under these assumptions, tax reform reduces
the value of capital by fraction τ c; the propor-
tional decline equals the consumption tax rate.
10
However, it is more realistic to assume the
production cost of capital increases as more is
produced. Since tax reform is likely to increase
investment for most types of capital, Q > Q*.
Also, the current income tax includes many
front-loaded investment incentives, so Z > 0.
The proportional decline in value is then less
than τ c and may vary across different types of
capital. Some types of capital may even rise in
value.
In the analysis below, I consider three
hypothetical firms, each of which holds capital
with a value of 400 prior to tax reform. The first
firm holds capital that is produced at constant
cost and receives no front-loaded incentives, so
replacing the income tax with a 25 percent con-
sumption tax reduces its value by 25 percent,
from 400 to 300. The second firm holds capital
that is produced at increasing cost and receives
some front-loaded investment incentives. Tax re-
form reduces its value by 10 percent, from 400
to 360. The third firm holds capital for which
increasing costs and front-loaded incentives are
even more pronounced. The value of this capi-
tal is unchanged by tax reform.
Tax Reform’s Impact on After-Tax Rate of Return
Before tax reform, the after-tax rate of
return is lower than the pretax rate of return.
Since the rates are equal after reform, either the
pretax rate must decline or the after-tax rate
must rise, or both. If the real pretax rate of
return was 6 percent per year and the real after-
tax rate was 4 percent per year, what is likely to
happen after reform eliminates the 2 percent
wedge the income tax imposes?
Table 2
Value of Capital and After-Tax Rates of Return
Effects in Initial Year
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Price of
foregone Firm’s Price of Value of
consumer tax securities capital
goods savings (A) – (B) (C)
Sales tax and VATs Q τ cQ (1–τ c)Q (1–τ c)Q
Income tax Q* ZQ*( 1 –Z )Q*( 1 –Z )Q*
Effects in Each Subsequent Year
(E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J)
Additional Return on Additional Rate of
consumer Firm’s securities Household’s consumption return
output tax (E) – (F) tax (G) – (H) (I) / (D)
Sales tax and VATs MPK–δ Q τ c(MPK–δ Q)( 1 –τ c)(MPK–δ Q)0 ( 1 –τ c)(MPK–δ Q)( MPK/Q)–δ
Income tax MPK*–δ Q* τ f[MPK * – (1–τ f) τ p(1–τ f)( 1 –τ p)(1–τ f)( 1 –τ p)(1–τ f)
(1–Z )δ Q*] – Zδ Q*[ MPK * – (1–Z )δ Q*] [MPK * – (1–Z )δ Q*] [MPK * – (1–Z )δ Q*] [MPK */Q*(1–Z ) – δ ]25 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2001
In the long run, the rate of return (pretax
and after tax) may be close to 4 percent. Even a
modest rise in the 4 percent after-tax return
would probably prompt additional saving that
eventually results in a large expansion of the
capital stock. The expansion of the capital stock
drives down its marginal product, lowering the
pretax rate of return well below 6 percent.
However, because this expansion of the capital
stock is the cumulative effect of the increased
flow of savings each year, it occurs only gradu-
ally. In the short run, therefore, the capital stock
has not expanded significantly and the rate of
return is likely to be close to 6 percent. The
after-tax rate of return rises by nearly the full 2
percentage points.
11
Asset owners’ well-being depends on the
equilibrium after-tax rate of return, as well as
the value of their assets. An asset’s value merely
measures the current consumption the owner
would receive from immediately liquidating it.
However, an owner who intends to consume
over an extended period benefits from the in-
crease in after-tax rates of return, to an extent
that depends on the length of his or her con-
sumption horizon.
12
Conversely, the well-being of a borrowing
household depends (negatively) on the after-tax
rate of return, as well as on the value of its 
liabilities. A liability’s value merely measures the
current consumption the borrower would have
to sacrifice to immediately retire it. However, a
borrower who intends to repay over an ex-
tended period is harmed by the increase in the
after-tax rate of return that must be paid on the
liability until it is repaid.
Debt Structure
I assume each of the three hypothetical
firms issues bonds with a value of 100, one-
quarter of its capital. The value of each firm’s
stock is 300, or three-quarters of capital. (These
ratios are close to the averages for nonfinancial
corporations.) I also consider a household that
makes a loan of 100 (Lender) and one that
receives the loan (Borrower).
Let r * denote the nominal after-tax rate of
return prior to reform. Each debt instrument
(firm bond or household loan) provides a nom-
inal pretax interest payment of r */(1 – τ p) each
year until it matures and a nominal principal
repayment of unity at maturity. Since nominal
interest payments are taxed at rate τ p under the
income tax, the holder of each instrument re-
ceives net payments of r *. Consider a debt in-
strument that matures M years after the reform.
Its price immediately before the unexpected
reform, denoted P *, is the present discounted
value of its after-tax payments, which is unity.
I now examine how an immediate, unex-
pected tax reform changes the value of bonds
and household loans. Subtracting the change in
the value of each firm’s bonds from the change
in the total value of its capital yields the change
in the value of its stock. The change in the value
of household loans controls the allocation of
wealth between lending and borrowing house-
holds.
Since nominal debt payments are fixed, an
important issue is whether the consumer price
level changes when the reform occurs. Since the
price level depends on money supply and de-
mand, it remains unchanged if the money sup-
ply is adjusted to offset any changes in money
demand resulting from tax reform.
13 I now con-
sider the effects of tax reform on asset values,
under the assumption this monetary policy is pur-
sued and the consumer price level is unchanged.
ASSET VALUES WITH UNCHANGED 
CONSUMER PRICE LEVEL
What happens to the value of outstanding
debt immediately after a 25 percent consump-
tion tax unexpectedly replaces the income tax?
The reform has two conflicting effects. First, the
price rises to reflect the tax savings bondholders
receive (the elimination of income tax on inter-
est payments). Second, the price is reduced
because future payments are discounted at a
higher equilibrium after-tax interest rate. In gen-
eral, the new price of the debt instrument is
where r is the nominal after-tax (and pretax)
interest rate after reform.
For simplicity, I assume the pretax interest
rate is constant during the M years after tax
reform, so the after-tax interest rate rises by the
amount of the former tax on interest income.
14
In other words, r equals r */(1 – τ p), the nomi-
nal pretax interest rate before reform.
Substituting into Equation 2 reveals that under
this assumption, the debt instrument’s price
remains equal to unity because the tax savings
offset the loss from the higher discount rate.
15
As Table 3 shows, the value of each firm’s
bonds remains equal to 100. The decline in the
value of each firm’s capital falls entirely on
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of the first firm’s capital declines by 25 percent,
from 400 to 300, the value of its stock declines
by 33 percent, from 300 to 200. As the value of
the second firm’s capital declines by 10 percent,
from 400 to 360, the value of its stock declines
by 13 percent, from 300 to 260. Because stock-
holders own only three-quarters of the firm but
bear the full wealth decline, their proportional
loss is four-thirds times the proportional decline
in capital value. For the third firm, whose capi-
tal value remains unchanged, neither bond-
holders nor stockholders experience any wealth
decline. The impact on stockholders varies, de-
pending on the type of capital their firms hold.
Also, although not shown in the table, the im-
pact is more (less) severe if firms are more (less)
leveraged.
Because the value of debt is unchanged
when r = r */(1 – τ p), there is no redistribution
of wealth between lending and borrowing house-
holds. As the second panel of Table 3 shows,
both the wealth of Lender and the liability of
Borrower remain equal to 100.
Transition Relief: Grandfather Existing Debt
Depending on their consumption horizons,
stockholders may be either better or worse off
because of tax reform. Although their initial
wealth declines, they benefit from earning the
higher equilibrium after-tax rate of return. Bond-
holders and household lenders, however, clearly
gain because they avoid any loss of initial wealth
—under the assumption r = r */(1 – τ p)—and
benefit from the higher equilibrium after-tax
rate of return if they do not immediately liqui-
date their assets and consume. Household bor-
rowers are harmed because their initial liability
is unchanged but they face higher future after-
tax borrowing rates.
16
Some believe these results are too gener-
ous to bondholders and household lenders and
too harsh on stockholders and household bor-
rowers.
17 These observers often advocate grand-
fathering debt instruments that are outstanding
on the reform date. Bondholders and household
lenders would continue to pay tax on interest
income from these instruments, although at rate
τ c rather than τ p, and firms and household bor-
rowers would deduct their interest expense
from these instruments at the same rate. In prin-
ciple, total revenues would be unchanged.
18
Under this policy, the value of outstanding
debt would be
Substituting in r = r */(1 – τ p) yields the price 
1 – τ c[1 – (1 + r)
–M]. For debt nearing maturity,
the value would still be close to unity. (The treat-
ment of interest is unimportant because most of
the present value consists of the imminent prin-
cipal repayment.) For debt far from maturity, the
proportional decline in value would approach
the tax rate. If the nominal pretax interest rate r
were 6 percent, with a 25 percent consumption
tax rate the decline in the price of debt with ten
years to maturity would be 11 percent.
The top panel of Table 4 shows the im-
pact of debt grandfathering on bondholders and
stockholders, using this 11 percent estimate.
Bondholders suffer an 11 percent loss at all
firms. Stockholders at the first firm suffer a 30
percent rather than a 33 percent loss, and those
at the second firm suffer a 10 percent rather
than a 13 percent loss. The third firm’s stock-
holders now gain wealth. Although the impact
differs across firms holding different types of
capital (or with different degrees of leverage),
debt grandfathering tends to make the propor-
tional losses of bondholders and stockholders


























Impact of Tax Reform with Unchanged Consumer Price Level
Allocation of Decline in Value of Capital
Capital Bonds Stock
Before tax reform
Each firm Value 400 100 300
After tax reform
First firm Value (% change) 300 (–25%) 100 (0) 200 (–33%)
Second firm Value (% change) 360 (–10%) 100 (0) 260 (–13%)
Third firm Value (% change) 400 (0) 100 (0) 300 (0)
Wealth Reallocation Between Household Lenders and Borrowers
Combined Lender Borrower
Before tax reform 0 100 –100
After tax reform 0 100 –100
Table 4
Impact of Tax Reform with Unchanged Consumer Price Level:
Existing Debt Grandfathered
Allocation of Decline in Value of Capital
Capital Bonds Stock
Before tax reform
Each firm Value 400 100 300
After tax reform
First firm Value (% change) 300 (–25%) 89 (–11%) 211 (–30%)
Second firm Value (% change) 360 (–10%) 89 (–11%) 271 (–10%)
Third firm Value (% change) 400 (0) 89 (–11%) 311 (+4%)
Wealth Reallocation Between Household Lenders and Borrowers
Combined Lender Borrower
Before tax reform 0 100 –100
After tax reform 08 9 –8927 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2001
As the bottom panel of Table 4 shows, the
household lender now suffers an 11 percent
wealth decline while the household borrower
enjoys an 11 percent decline in its liability.
Wealth is reallocated from lenders to borrowers.
If this policy is desired, it can be adminis-
tered most easily under a two-part VAT because
working households can report interest income
and expense on the same tax returns they use
to report wages. The policy is less convenient
under a sales tax or traditional VAT because
households must file new tax returns solely to
report interest income and expense.
19
COULD TAX REFORM INDUCE AN 
INCREASE IN CONSUMER PRICES?
The above analysis assumes the consumer
price level is unchanged by tax reform. The
asset pricing implications are different if the
consumer price level rises in response to tax
reform. Some argue that the labor-market effects
of adopting a sales tax or traditional VAT may
prompt a monetary policy response that raises
the consumer price level.
Labor Markets under Alternative Tax Systems
To understand this argument, I consider a
simple perturbation to the circular flow between
firms and workers (Table 5 ). A firm purchases
one additional unit of labor from a household
and produces additional consumption. Let MPL
and MPL* denote the marginal product of labor
under a consumption tax and the income tax,
respectively. For the firm to be indifferent to this
perturbation, its after-tax receipts from selling
the additional consumption must equal its wage
payment. After paying any applicable taxes, the
household consumes its additional wages.
Under the sales tax and the traditional VAT,
the firm pays an additional tax of τ cMPL on its
additional consumption output. For the firm to
be indifferent to the perturbation, the equilib-
rium value of its wage payment to the house-
hold must be (1 – τ c)MPL. Since the household
pays no tax, its consumption increases by this
amount.
Under the two-part VAT (which taxes the
firm on value added minus wage payments), the
perturbation does not change the firm’s tax lia-
bility because its value added and wage pay-
ments rise by the same amount. For the firm to
be indifferent to this perturbation, the equilib-
rium value of its wage payment must be MPL.
However, the household pays tax of τ cMPL on
its wage income, so its consumption increases
by only (1 – τ c)MPL.
Under the income tax, this perturbation
does not change the firm’s tax liability because its
receipts and wage expenses increase by the same
amount. For the firm to be indifferent to the
perturbation, the equilibrium value of its wage
payment must be MPL*. However, the house-
hold pays tax of τ pMPL* on its wage income, so
its consumption increases by only (1 – τ p)MPL*.
Each of the three consumption tax designs
distorts the labor–leisure decision by driving a
wedge at rate τ c between the marginal product
of labor and the after-tax wage rate. The income
tax also distorts this decision by driving a simi-
lar wedge at rate τ p.
To consider the transitional impact of tax
reform on labor markets, I make a few simpli-
fying assumptions. Although tax reform is likely
to greatly increase the marginal product of labor
in the long run by significantly expanding the
capital stock, the short-run change in marginal
product should be small because (as discussed
above) the capital stock expands only gradually.
So I assume the marginal product of labor is 
initially unchanged, MPL = MPL*.
20 I consider a
worker with a marginal product of twelve con-
sumer goods per hour, who earns $12 per hour
when these goods sell for $1 each, and I assume
Table 5
Equilibrium Wage Rates
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Payment Wage payment Worker’s
received from Firm’s to worker Worker’s net wage
households tax (A) – (B) tax (C) – (D)
Sales tax, traditional VAT MPL τ cMPL (1–τ c)MPL 0( 1 –τ c)MPL
Two-part VAT MPL 0 MPL τ cMPL (1–τ c)MPL
Income tax MPL*0 MPL* τ pMPL*( 1 –τ p)MPL*FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 28
the consumption and personal income tax rates
are both 25 percent.
The replacement of the income tax with a
two-part VAT has little impact on labor markets
because these taxes are similar in form as well
as substance. Table 5 implies that under either
tax, the firm pays the worker $12 and the worker
pays $3 tax. Under the current income tax, firms
withhold the worker’s wage tax, so the paycheck
is actually $9, with a stub noting that the worker
is being paid $12, $3 of which is withheld for
taxes. Hall and Rabushka (1995, 145) propose
similar withholding under a two-part VAT.
The treatment of wages under a sales tax
or traditional VAT differs in form, but not in 
substance, from that under an income tax
because the tax is imposed on the firm rather
than the worker. In accordance with Table 5,
the firm now pays a wage rate of only $9
because it retains only 75 cents after tax for
each of the twelve goods the worker produces.
The paycheck amount is still $9, but the stub is
now different, showing $9 as the wage with no
tax withheld. The worker owes no additional tax,
and disposable income is still $9. This wage-rate
adjustment illustrates the public-finance princi-
ple that imposing a tax on the seller rather than
the buyer has no real economic effect because
the equilibrium price adjusts by the amount of
the tax.
Potential Nominal-Wage Rigidity 
and Monetary Accommodation
Some argue that this adjustment may not
easily occur. They note the longstanding litera-
ture suggesting that workers resist nominal-
wage reductions and argue that this resistance
applies to reductions in the wage rate listed on
the paycheck stub, not reductions in take-home
pay.
21 Even if such resistance does not exist,
they note that the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) prohibits the necessary adjustment for
lower-paid workers. This law prescribes a mini-
mum value (currently $5.15 per hour) for the
wage rate shown on the paycheck stub.
If the listed wage rate remains rigid, the
adoption of a sales tax or traditional VAT has
problematic labor-market consequences. After
paying sales tax or VAT, firms retain only 75
cents for each unit produced and they can prof-
itably hire workers at a $12 wage rate only if
their marginal product is fifteen units, rather
than the twelve units possible before reform.
The implied hiring reduction and unemploy-
ment could be substantial.
The literature on nominal-wage rigidity
generally assumes workers do not resist real-
wage reductions achieved through inflation.
Similarly, since the FLSA minimum wage is not
indexed, its real value can be reduced through
inflation. If nominal-wage rigidity otherwise
impedes the necessary adjustment, a possible
response is a monetary policy that rapidly in-
creases the consumer price level by a factor of
1/(1 – τ c).
22 I refer to this policy as “full accom-
modation” of the consumption tax and to a
smaller price increase as partial accommoda-
tion.
Full accommodation raises the price of
consumer goods to $1.33. Since firms retain $1
after paying sales tax or VAT, they can profitably
hire workers at a $12 wage rate if their marginal
product is twelve units, the same as before re-
form. The necessary real-wage adjustment occurs
without any reduction in nominal wages.
It is unclear whether nominal-wage rigid-
ity poses a problem. Workers who resist isolated
reductions in their nominal wage rate may accept
an economywide reduction made in response to
a highly visible change in tax policy, particularly
when take-home pay is unaffected. Congress
can also amend the FLSA when it adopts tax
reform. Accommodation may be unnecessary.
I make no prediction about whether mone-
tary policy would accommodate all, some, or
none of a sales tax or traditional VAT. Instead, I
compare the asset-price effects of tax reform
under the different possibilities. I have already
described the effects without accommodation
and now describe them with full accommoda-
tion. Intermediate effects occur under partial
accommodation.
ASSET PRICE EFFECTS WITH 
FULL ACCOMMODATION
With accommodation, the nominal interest
rate (and the inflation rate) is extremely high
during the brief period when the price level is
rising. If r = r */(1 – τ p) thereafter, full accom-
modation reduces the real value of debt by fac-
tor τ c.
As the top panel of Table 6 shows, bond
values fall from 100 to 75 at each firm. At the
first firm, as total value falls from 400 to 300,
stock values fall from 300 to 225, which is also
a 25 percent decline. At the second firm, how-
ever, as total value declines from 400 to 360,
stock values fall only from 300 to 285, a mere 5
percent. At the third firm, where total firm value
is unchanged at 400, stock values actually rise,
from 300 to 325. Overall, bondholders now bear
heavier burdens than stockholders, reversing
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The value of the household loan also falls
from 100 to 75. As the bottom panel of Table 6
shows, the household lender suffers a 25 per-
cent wealth decline while the household bor-
rower enjoys a 25 percent decline in the value
of its liability.
23
Although this analysis generally ignores
consumer-owned capital, it should be noted
that accommodation benefits homeowners with
mortgages at the expense of mortgage lenders,
in the same way it benefits stockholders of lev-
eraged firms at bondholders’ expense. Consider
a homeowner with a $120,000 house and an
$80,000 mortgage, and assume that tax reform
reduces the home’s real value to $110,000.
24 If
the consumption tax is not accommodated, the
real value of the mortgage is still $80,000 and
the homeowner suffers a 25 percent decline in
home equity, from $40,000 to $30,000. But if the
tax is fully accommodated, the real value of the
mortgage falls to $60,000 and the homeowner’s
equity rises from $40,000 to $50,000, as the
mortgage lender bears more than the full bur-
den of the decline in value. (Of course, accom-
modation is irrelevant if the homeowner does
not have a mortgage.)
Some believe an accommodated consump-
tion tax would be too harsh on bondholders
and household lenders and too favorable to
stockholders and household borrowers, the
opposite of the concerns expressed with no
accommodation. If accommodation is consid-
ered undesirable, it can be avoided by adopting
a two-part VAT. Or if a sales tax or traditional
VAT is adopted, steps can be taken to facilitate
rapid nominal-wage adjustment. Or if nominal-
wage rigidity is considered inevitable, the need
for accommodation can be avoided by phasing
in the sales tax or VAT and phasing out the
income tax over an extended period. With a
smooth ten-year phase-in, for example, nominal
wages need fall only 2.5 percent per year from
their prereform path; if they had been growing
4 percent per year, they can still grow 1.5 per-
cent per year during the phase-in, avoiding out-
right reductions. However, since firms have an
incentive to delay investment while a consump-
tion tax is phased in, it may be better to imme-
diately replace the income tax with a two-part
VAT and then phase in a sales tax or traditional
VAT and phase out the two-part VAT.
CONCLUSION
Replacing the income tax with a con-
sumption tax—whether in the form of a sales
tax, traditional VAT, or two-part VAT (“flat
tax”)—is likely to reduce the total value of the
capital stock. The division of this reduction
between bondholders and stockholders and the
effects on household lenders and borrowers
largely depend on whether the tax is accommo-
dated in the form of a higher consumer price
level. Accommodation is unlikely under a two-
part VAT, but observers disagree about its like-
lihood under a sales tax or traditional VAT.
If the consumption tax is not accommo-
dated, the real value of debt changes little. The
decline in the value of capital is largely borne
by stockholders, and there is little reallocation
of wealth between household borrowers and
lenders. With full accommodation, the real value
of debt is sharply reduced. Bondholders bear
heavier burdens than stockholders, and house-
hold borrowers gain at the expense of house-
hold lenders.
These transitional effects deserve careful
attention in the evaluation and implementation
of tax reform.
NOTES
I am grateful to Mark Wynne, Mine Yücel, Greg
Huffman, and V. Brian Viard for helpful comments.
1 For pedagogical purposes, I compare the application
of the various tax systems to a fixed level and compo-
sition of output. This does not imply that equilibrium
output is the same under the different taxes. As dis-
cussed elsewhere in this article, the income tax equilib-
rium differs from the consumption tax equilibrium.
2 Koenig and Huffman (1998, 25–26), Congressional
Budget Office (1997, 7–16), Gravelle (1996, 1422–28),
Auerbach (1996, 43–46), and Joint Committee on
Taxation (1995, 51–52, 57–58) also describe these tax
designs. Another tax system is a personal consumption
tax in which each household is taxed on its consumption
and firms are not taxed. This design, which has received
little attention in the past few years, is not considered here.
Table 6
Impact of Tax Reform with Full Accommodation
Allocation of Decline in Value of Capital
Capital Bonds Stock
Before tax reform
Each firm Value 400 100 300
After tax reform
First firm Value (% change) 300 (–25%) 75 (–25%) 225 (–25%)
Second firm Value (% change) 360 (–10%) 75 (–25%) 285 (–5%)
Third firm Value (% change) 400 (0) 75 (–25%) 325 (+8%)
Wealth Reallocation Between Household Lenders and Borrowers
Combined Lender Borrower
Before tax reform 0 100 –100
After tax reform 07 5 –75FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 30
3 See Viard (2000, 6, 19 note 5) and the references
cited therein.
4 Viard (2000, 7), Bradford (2000, 68), Koenig and
Huffman (1998, 26), Congressional Budget Office
(1997, 66), Gravelle (1996, 1425), Auerbach (1996,
30–31), and Joint Committee on Taxation (1995, 55)
note this equality.
5 The name is particularly misleading because this 
tax has the potential to be less flat than the sales tax
or traditional VAT. Hall and Rabushka (1995, 55)
propose that the household component include a
nonrefundable exemption, and another prominent
academic supporter, Bradford (2000, 67–70), suggests
that it have a progressive rate structure. Bradford calls
this tax the X-tax. Koenig and Huffman (1998) and
Joint Committee on Taxation (1995, 57) call it the
Hall–Rabushka tax, while Hall (1996) calls it the
Hall–Rabushka VAT. Congressional Budget Office
(1997) calls it the bifurcated VAT.
6 Intermediate inputs remain outside the tax base
because they do not add to net national product.
Since they are immediately used up, depreciation
always equals production.
7 Sections 263 and 263A of the Internal Revenue Code
prohibit firms from deducting purchases of capital or
the costs of producing internal-use capital, while
section 162 allows a deduction for intermediate inputs.
Litigation has increased in the past decade as the IRS
has become more vigilant, albeit selectively, in deny-
ing deductions for intangible capital. Section 168 sets
fixed depreciation schedules for tangible capital, and
section 197 sets a fifteen-year schedule for many
purchases of intangible capital. However, section 167
requires that internally produced intangible capital be
depreciated over its “useful life,” which is another
source of litigation.
8 If the “new view” of corporate financial policy is valid,
firms are at a corner solution in which they issue no
new stocks. The perturbation in the text must be
modified to have the firm reduce dividends rather than
issue securities. Since the imposition of a higher
personal tax rate on dividends than on capital gains
then has effects similar to those of front-loaded invest-
ment incentives, Z can be viewed as including this tax
rate differential. Viard (2000, 14–16), Congressional
Budget Office (1997, 67), Gillis, Mieszkowski, and
Zodrow (1996, 748), and Auerbach (1996, 37, 69)
discuss the new view and its implications.
9 The perturbation reduces production of consumer
goods by one unit, but the securities-owning house-
hold reduces its purchases by only (1 – τ c)Q units. 
A household that receives lower transfer payments
(due to the revenue loss) reduces consumption
purchases by τ cQ, closing the circle.
10 Viard (2000, 8–11) presents this simplified analysis in
greater detail.
11 Huffman and Koenig (1998, 25), Auerbach (1996,
58–59), and Kotlikoff (1996, 174–76) provide more
detail on how tax reform may affect rates of return.
12 Viard (2000, 10), Congressional Budget Office (1997,
67), Gillis, Mieszkowski, and Zodrow (1996, 748),
Auerbach (1996, 60), and Joint Committee on Taxation
(1995, 87) make this point.
13 Tax reform is likely to initially reduce the real quantity
of money demanded by raising after-tax interest rates
and temporarily lowering consumption. So keeping
consumer prices unchanged may require slowing
money growth.
14 The assumption that the pretax interest rate is
unchanged shortly after tax reform is inspired by the
previous conclusion that the marginal product of
capital is little changed at that time. However, this
reasoning is simplistic. Before reform, the pretax
interest rate may not equal the net-of-depreciation
marginal product because bonds and stocks receive
different firm-level tax treatment. Congressional
Budget Office (1997, 33–34) and Auerbach (1996,
48–49) discuss this difficult issue.
15 Municipal bonds, which this article does not consider,
clearly decline in value because they receive no tax
savings (they are already tax-exempt) but are subject
to the higher discount rate.
16 Recall the assumption that the current income tax
allows borrowers to deduct interest expense. If interest
is nondeductible (as it is for some loans), tax reform
does not change borrowing costs.
17 For example, Bradford (2000, 111), Koenig and
Huffman (1998, 26), and Pearlman (1996, 421)
describe this outcome as a “windfall” for bondholders
and household lenders. Bradford (2000, 101) and
Gravelle (1996, 1445) note that leverage magnifies the
impact on stockholders.
18 Variants of this policy are proposed or discussed by
Bradford (2000, 110–11), Koenig and Huffman (1998,
26), Pearlman (1996, 420–23), and Hall and Rabushka
(1995, 79–80). Pearlman argues that in practice, this
policy could reduce total revenue.
19 Pearlman (1996, 408, 413) notes that transition relief is
less likely to be offered under a sales tax. Another form
of transition relief allows firms to deduct depreciation
on existing capital. This relief is most beneficial to short-
lived types of capital, as Viard (2000, 11) and Bradford
(2000, 110) note. The tax savings flow to stockholders
as residual claimants, with no effects on bondholders
or household lenders and borrowers. The resulting
revenue loss raises the revenue-neutral tax rate.
20 With endogenous labor supply, tax reform may initially
reduce the marginal product of labor. See Huffman
and Koenig (1998, 25), Auerbach (1996, 57–58), and
Kotlikoff (1996, 175).
21 Taylor (1999, 1013–21) surveys the literature on
nominal-wage rigidity.
22 Bradford (2000, 100–102), Congressional Budget
Office (1997, 65–66), Gillis, Mieszkowski, and Zodrow31 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2001
(1996, 752–53), Hall (1996, 77–78), Auerbach (1996,
44 fn. 29), Gravelle (1996, 1441–42), and Viard (1994)
discuss these issues. Most, but not all, of these
authors suggest that nominal-wage rigidity will require
some accommodation of a sales tax or traditional VAT.
23 Accommodation also lowers the real value of the $3
trillion of nominal debt the U.S. Treasury owes to the
public, thereby lowering the tax rate required for long-
run budget neutrality.
24 Tax reform is likely to reduce the value of consumer-
owned capital, such as owner-occupied homes, along
with the value of business capital, but for different
reasons, reflecting the distinctive tax treatment of
consumer capital. See Viard (2000, 11–13), Bradford
(2000, 107), and Congressional Budget Office (1997,
66–67).
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